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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
1. First Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property.

The property involved in this suit is owned by Burns Holdings, LLC ("Burns"), where
three attempts to change Madison County's comprehensive plan designation on the property has
been made, requesting a change from an agriculture designation to a commercial andlor light
industrial designation. This began in 1979 when the original property owner, Bruce Shirley, sold
property located near the north Rexburg interchange to Gayle and Grant Taylor of Rexburg,
~daho.' On April 10,2003, a public hearing was held with the Madison County Planning and
Zoning Commission ("Commission") wherein the owner asked that this property's comprehensive
The Commission was concerned
plan designation be changed from agricultural to comrner~ial.~
The
with "safety issues of the overpass, the traffic, infrastructure and the de~elo~ment."~
Commission then unanimously denied the request because of safety problems.4 On April 14,2003,
the comprehensive plan change then went before the Board of Madison County Commissioners
("Board') where Ms. Taylor indicated she owned 46.8 acres on the north interchange and was
requesting approval of the comprehensive plan change to commercial use.5 Among other
opposition, the City of Rexburg appeared and requested that it be denied because it did not
confonn to the present general principals for change at the north area of the county.6 Board
member Passey noted that although he believed this area would become commercial in the future,

' R. Vol.4 Bums Tab 4 at 2-3
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab I at 3
R. Vol 4 Bums Tab 1 at 4
Id
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 3.
R. Vol 4 Bums Tab 2 at 3.
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he was against it because of safety

issue^.^

Board member Muir stated his "main concerns were

access, adequate vision, safety and [the] number of accidents in this area."' The Board then
unanimously denied the proposed comprehensive plan change because "it was not in harmony
with Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance [.I"'
2. Second Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property.

On January 22,2004, a public hearing was again held for the property at issue here,
wherein Gayle and Grant Taylor again requested a comprehensive plan change designation on
their property from agricultural to light industrial zoning.I0 The Commission voted to allow the
comprehensive plan change to light industrial by a vote of four in favor and three against.''
Concerns of the two Commission members who voted against it were traffic, and dangers of the
road.'' Another Cominission member wasnot convinced that a light industrial zoning is needed
on the north interchange of Rexhurg. The zoning hearing was held right after the above mentioned
first hearing, where the Taylors requested the land next be re-zoned from agricultural to light
industria1.l3 The Commission recommended to allow for a light industrial zoning, with four
voting for it and three against it, for the same reasons stated above.14
On February 17,2004, the Board held a public hearing on the Taylor property
comprehensive zone change.I5After hearing public testimony on the matter and after deliberations,
the Board unanimously denied Taylors' application for proposed amendment of the Madison
7

R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 4.

* R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 4.

'R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 2 at 4. Note, that the third Board member, Commissioner Sommer, was excused due to illness in
his family (R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 2 at 1).
l o R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 2.
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 7.
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 6.
l 3 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 7.
l4 R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 4 at 9.
IS
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 8 at p.4, LL.1 through p.5, LL.5.

"
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County comprehensive plan, which attempted to add an industrial zone near the north Rexburg
interchange on October 20, 2004.16 The reasons for the denial were: the negative impact on
property rights; the negative impact on adjacent residential neighborhoods; barriers to commercial
usage; access difficulties regarding transportation; negative impact on surrounding housing;
improper spot zoning; the zoning is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in that the
objective in Madison County is to preserve agricultural lands; and, it was not in the best interest of
the people of Madison C ~ u n t y . ' ~
On April 16,2004, Burns executed a Warranty Deed on the Taylor property, and on
September 27,2004, Burns executed another Warranty Deed on the Newman property, buying the
property at issue in this case.''
3. Third Attempt to Change Comprehensive Plan Designation on Property.

On November 22,2004, Bums first appeared and filed a request for a comprehensive plan
designation change on the property they now own-the
attempts-from

same property subject to the prior two

Burns further requested a
transitional agricultural to commercial and ind~strial.'~

zone change from agricultural to commercial, with an imbedded industrial zone." The property
was described as approximately 50 acres located on the northwest corner of the intersection of
Highway 20 and Salem Highway, located in Madison County, idaho.'' The proposed use for the
industrial property by Bums was to establish a new concrete production facility.22 The concrete
production facility proposed for the property would consist of a concrete batch plant, a small truck

l6

R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 7 at 29.

" R.

Vol. 4 Bum Tab 7 at 26-28.

'' R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 12, attachment #5 and#6.
R. Val. 4 Bums Tab 12, Madison County Zone Change Application.
2o Id.

Vol. 4 Bums Tab 12, Letter to Madison County Planning & Zoning &om Bums dated November 19,2004.
22 Id.
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shop, and an office building.23 The concrete batch plant would mix aggregates, cement, and water
together to produce a concrete product that is delivered to jobsites in concrete mixer trucks.24
On December 16,2004, a public hearing was held before the Commission regarding
Bums' comprehensive plan change and zone change requests on their property.25That same night,
Walters Concrete was also asking for a comprehensive plan and zone change on property they
owned in

exb bur^.'^

Burns' request was to change the comprehensive plan's designation and

~~
zoning designation from transitional agricultural to commercial with light i n d ~ s t r i a l .After
review of Bums' application, the Commission recommended approval by a nine to one vote for the
comprehensive plan change, and tabled the zone change for a later date.28 On January 13,2005, a
public hearing was held regarding the zone change, wherein after reviewing the Bums' application,
the zone change was recommended for approval by the Commission by a six to one vote.29
The recommendation then went to the Board wherein a public hearing on the Bums'
comprehensive plan and zone change was held on February 28,2005.~' After discussion, the
decision was tabled by the Board until March 7,2005.~' On March 7,2005, the Board voted two to
one to deny the Burns comprehensive plan change, thus, there was no need to decide the proposed
Bums' zone change.32The Board issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 11,
2005, confirming the denial to change the designation of the comprehensive plan on Bums'

Id.
Id.
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14
" R. Vo1.4 Walters Tab 10.
27 R. Vo1.4 Burns Tab 14.
R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 17, R Vol. 4 Burns Tab 14 at 18.
29 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 22.
30 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 26 at 1; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 27 at 1.
31 R. Vol. 4 Burns Tab 26 at 13; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 27 at 34.
32 R. VOI. 4 Bums Tab 28
23

24

'*

'*
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property from agricultural to commercial and light indu~trial.~~
The reasons the Board gave for its
denial were: the negative impact on property rights, particularly property values; the close
proximity to several substantial residential neighborhoods and the negative impact on thein;
serious access difficulties regarding transportation especially where "a substantial portion of
proposed new traffic to the site will include heavily laden cement and delivery vehicles"; impact
on recreation regarding the site's location on a "major access route to the St. Anthony sand dunes

[;I"

impact on the ncighborhood residential uses; the plan would require "pieccmeal zoning"

which "does not allow the County to comply with its State mandated responsibility to plan
comprehensively, particularly in the area of coin~nunitydesign. The County should continue to
group industrial uses, and aim them toward areas where city services are available [;I"
implementation of the proposed amendment would require a "substantial rewrite" of the existing
comprehensive plan; the zoning is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in the areas of
"agricultural lands, industrial uses, economic development, transportation and community design
[;I" and, it is not in the best interest of the people of Madison
4. Burns' First Petition for Judicial Review.

Prior to the Board's April 1 1,2005 decision denying Burns' application for comprehensive
plan change, Burns preemptively filed its first Petition For Judicial Review on April 1 , 2 0 0 5 . ~ ~
Bums argued the Board's actions were "in violation of Constitutional and Statutory provisions, or
in excess of the Board's statutory authority, were made upon unlawful procedure, were not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and were arbitrary, capricious, and an

l3 R.

Vol. 4 Bums Tab 29 at 42.

" R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 29 at 38-41.
'' R. Vol. 1 at 1-4.
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abuse of di~cretion."~~
After the Board's written findings were issued on April 11,2005, Burns
~
the Board's actions
again filed another Petition for Judicial Review on May 4 , 2 0 0 5 , ~arguing
were made upon unlawhl procedure, the Board did not issue written decisions with respect to the
zone change, Bums' rights under the due process clause of the Constitution were violated, and one
of the Board members had a conflict of interest in this matter.38
Madison County's Deputy Prosecutor, Penny J. Stanford, answcred with affirmative
defenses and counterclaims on May 12,2005, alleging no violations of procedure or law occurred
as outlined by

Bums then filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment on October 4,2005.~' The County replied by way of its Respondent's Reply Brief on
November 30,2005.~'Bums then filed Bums' Response to the County's Reply Brief dated
January 1 7 , 2 0 0 6 . ~ ~
The parties set the date of March 13,2006, for oral arguments to be heard before the district
Before oral arguments however, the district court judge, the Honorable Brent Moss, met
with both attorneys in chambers, wherein "the parties agreed and stipulated that this matter is
properly remanded back to the Board of County Commissioners

The Court's Order

also noted the parties agreed that the Board may re-address any specific issues or the entire

36

R. Vol. 1 at 3.

''The first Petition For Judicial Review, dated April 1,2005, was in Case No.: CV-05-255 (R. Vol. 1 at 1); the second,

dated May 3,2005, was in Case No.: CV-05-340 (R. Vol. 1 at 10). These were later consolidated by Order into
CV-05-255, on June 9,2005 (R. Vol. 1 at 96-98)..
R. Vol. 1 at 10-15.
R. Vol. 1 at 10-29.
40 R. VOI. 1 at 104.
R. Vol. 1 at 152.
R.Vol. 2 at 273.
43 R. Vo1. 2 at 328-329.
44 R. Vol. 2 at 331-333. Significantly, the Order and record are absent of any statements raised by Burns in its
Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp. 6-9, as to what Judge Moss said or did not say while in
chambers. The Order and record just state both parties simply stipulated to a remand back to the Board (R. Vol. 2 at

'"

"
"
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matter?' The district court also preserved the issue of attorney's fees to be addressed at a later
time.46
On April 13,2006, the Board met for the purpose to again completely review the Burns
hearing (as well as Walters) from February 28,2005, and to make another decision regarding the
proposed comprehensive plan change and, if accepted, then decide the proposed zone change?7
There, the Board again considered all transportation plans and safety analyses submitted, collision
data from the Idaho Transportation Department, aerial maps, Commission's Findings of Fact,
copies of the appeal record submitted to the district court, the minutes submitted at the February 28,
2005 public hearing, all letters and petitions from the citizens who submitted information at that
The Board also reviewed
hearing, and the written findings the Board issued on August 11,2005.~~
the Walters matter they heard before the Burns matter on February 28, 2005, re-listened to the CD
of Mr. Pline's presentation, and re-reviewed copies of the Madison County zoning ordinance and
Madison County comprehensive plan.49 The Board also reviewed the component analysis as
required by state law, going through each individual component outlined in Idaho Code 5
67-6508.'~
Affer reviewing all the transcripts, exhibits, presentations, documents and video presented
again, the Board voted two to one to deny Bums' proposed comprehensive plan change, making a
decision on the proposed zone change unnecessary.51 The Board issued its written Findings of

45

id.

" R. Vol. 2 at 332.
R. VO!. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 5, April 13,2006
(initially inadvertently dated February 13,2006), Public Hearing transcript, at p.1, LL. 1-13.
Id. at p.3, LL.8-25; p.4, LL.1-25; p.5, LL.1.
49 Id.
Id.at p.12, LL.1-20; p.14, LL.4 through p.53, LL.6
51
id.aat p.69, LL.22 through p.72, LL.9.
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Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 1 , 2 0 0 6 . ~The
~ reasons outlined by the Board for the denial
include, in pertinent part, the following:53
Property rights. The negative impact on property rights because approval would require
inserting "an island of industrial zoning into the middle of residential and agricultural properties

[;I" and is improper per Idaho Code $ 67-6508(a);
r Population.

The close proximity to several substantial residential neighborhoods and the

negative impact on them. Further, residential trends in the area by the site would be ncgatively
altered;
Land Use. A cement batch plant is not compatible next to housing, and the proposed
amendment is "merely reactive" and would be "improper spot zoning [;I"
Public Services, Facilities and Utilities. The comprehensive plan requires industrial uses
be located where they can be "supplied with public services such as cities can provide" and Bums'
facility has no services available to it;
Transportation. The north highway interchange near the proposed site has "sight and
other inadequacies" which worsen where a substantial portion of the new traffic using the access
would be heavy cement and delivery vehicles;
Recreation. Impact from the site's location on a "major access route to the St. Anthony
Sand Dunes [;I"
Housing. The proposcd amendment would have a negative overall impact on the
neighborhood residential uses, and if the property is no longer used, it should be used as
residential;
52 R. Vo1.3 at 394; 437; R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item
number 6, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Madison
County, Idaho, dated June 1,2006.
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Community Design. The proposed plan would require "improper spot zoning" and not
allow for the grouping of industrial areas nor aim them towards city services. Further, variations
from the comprehensive plan would not allow for the beautification of the community where this
location is'a major doorway into Madison County, per Idaho Code 5 67-6508(m);
Implementation. Implementation of the proposed amendment would require a
"substantial rewrite" of the existing comprehensive plan;
The proposed amendment is not harmonious with the comprehensive plan in the areas of
"property rights, population, land use, public services, facilities and utilities, transportation,
community design and implementation, and should be denied [;I" and,
It is not in the best interest of the people of Madison County.
5. Burns' Second Petition for Judicial Review.

Bums then filed an Amended Petition for Judicial Review on approximately July 3 , 2 0 0 6 . ~ ~
After both parties fully briefed the issues, Judge Moss issued his Decision On Review dated
October 17,2006, affirming the Board's June 1,2006 decision.55 In the court's Decision On
Review, the district court specifically held that the Board did not violate any constitutional or
statutory provisions, nor did the Board exceed its statutory

The court held that the

Board's decision was not made upon unlawful procedure and was supported by substantial
evidence after reviewing the record as a whole and the component analysis required by Idaho Code
§ 67-6508.~~
Finally, the court held the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse

Notwithstanding, the district court held that Bums was entitled to an award of
of di~cretion.~~

53 Id., at pp.20-23.
"R. Vol. 2 at 341-342.
55 R. Vo1. 3 at 488-506.
56 Id.
Id.
" Id.
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partial attorney's fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121, due to a misinterpretation of evidence and a
possible conflict of interest on the Board's part.59 Therefore the court held that Bums was a
prevailing party only as of March 13,2006.'~
Bums filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court dated November 28,2006."
Upon Madison County motioning the district court to reconsider the attorney's fees issue, and after
hearing argument on the same, the district court made its Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to
Reconsider Attorney's Fee Award on January 23,2007, wherein the district court held the Board
had in fact prevailed on all issues and the record did not in fact support any finding that the actions
taken by the Board were pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, per Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code $12-121." Hence, the court's prior decision to award
attorney's fees to Burns was erroneously made and the court denied Bums' Motion for ~ e e s . ~ ~
The district court made its Order Affirming Decision of County Board of County
~ Bums'
Commissioners and Denying Request for Attorney's Fees on January 2 3 , 2 0 0 7 . ~After
Motion for Reconsideration, the district court again reaffirmed itself by Order dated May 3,2007,
maintaining its position outlined in its previous January 23, 2007 Order, and firther stated that
"Idaho Code 5 12-121 sets out a rigorous standard that Burns fails to e~tablish."~~
Bums filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to this Court dated June 7,2007, additionally
arguing whether it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-11 7 . ~ ~
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11. ISSUES ON

APPEAL^^

1.

Was the Commission's decision on the Burns application results-oriented in light
of the Commission's decision on the Walters, which was decided at the same time?

2.

Should the decision in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137
Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002) be extended to require that oral testimony of lay
witnesses in opposition to official and expert reports be supported by other credible
evidence before such lay testinlony can be adopted?

3.

Was the Commission's decision arbitrary and capricious and not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole?

4.

Has a substantial right of Burns been prejudiced?

5.

Is Burns entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal to the district court
pursuant to ldaho Code 12-117, and/or an award of attorney's fees on appeal to
this court?
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Would granting Burns' request for a comprehensive plan change amount to invalid
spot zoning?
IV. ARGUMENT

A.

General Standard of Review on Appeal from District Courts to Appellate Courts.
The following statutes and court rules govern judicial review in Idaho. In 1975, the Idaho

legislature adopted an extensive recodification of the laws in this State relating to planning and
~ Local Land Use Planning Act of 1975
zoning, in the Local Planning Act of 1 9 7 5 . ~This
("LLUPA") allows for judicial review under the provisions of the Idaho Administrative
The APA applies to judicial review of "an agency," which it defines as
Procedures Act ("APA").~~
a "state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine

"As presented in Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp.10-I1
Gump~echtv Cily of Coeur d' Alene, 104 Idaho 615,617,661 P.2d 1214,121 6 (Idaho 1983).
69 ldaho Code $5 67-6519(4), 67-6521(1)(d).
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contested cases . . . ."" In addition to LLUPA and the APA:'

judicial review is also governed by

~~
to the comprehensive plan done by
Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil ~ r o c e d u r e .Amendments
the Board are "quasi-judicial" actions and are subject to review under LLUPA and the APA.'~
Since LLUPA adopts the judicial review provisions of the APA for review of these quasijudicial actions, we must turn to the standards set out by the APA for judicial review, found in
Idaho Code 5 67-5279. Section 67-5279(3) sets forth the standard of review for this Court. It
states as follows:

(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affinn the agency action
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawfil procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall he set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for other proceedings as n e c c ~ s a r ~ . ~ ~

...
if this Court finds the underlying decision was in violation of any provision of Idaho Code

5 67-5279(3)(a)-(e), Bums must then show that a "substantial right" has been prejudiced per Idaho
Code 5 67-5279(4).

70 Idaho Code $
71 The APA

67-5201(2); Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Idaho 1997).
is codified in Idaho Code 5 8 67-5201 to 67-5292, as first enacted in 1965 and subsequently amended in

1992.
Which mles largely outline timeframes to follow unless otherwise prescribed by statute. See I.R.C.P. 84(b)(l).
73 ~eegenemlly
Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407,410-41 1,614 P.2d 947,950-951 (Idaho 1980).
"Idaho Code $67-5279(3).
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"In a subsequent appeal from a district court's decision in which the district court was
acting in its appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedure's Act (APA), the Supreme
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision."75 As to the facts,
this Court reviews them in the same manner as the district court, in that "[tlhe standards governing
judicial review in a case involving the LLUPA provide that this Court does not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented."76 Indeed, "[iJt is not
the role of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence."77 "[Tlhis Court defers to the agency's

"A strong presumption of validity favors an
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneou~."~~
agency's actions."79
B.

The Board's decision on the Burns' application was not results-oriented in light of
the Board's decision on the Walters' application, which was decided at the same
time!'
Burns begins by arguing the Board's decision was "results-oriented" when compared to

another Board decision in ~ a l t e r s . " Burns aims this at the arbitrary and capricious standard set
forth in the APA." This Court has held, "there is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the
action of zoning boards and we have upheld the validity of their actions whenever they are free
This standard applies to the exercise of
from capriciousness, arbitrariness, or discriminati~n."~~
discretion by the Board and was summed up as follows:
This standard is often phrased in the negative: an agency decision would be
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion if it were not based on those factors
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,784,86 P.3d 494,498 (Idaho 2004).
141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091,1094 (Idaho 2005).
77 Duvisco Foods Inf 'I lnc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784,790,118 P.3d 116,122 (Idaho 2005).
78 Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091,1094 (Idaho 2005) (internal citations omitted).
79 young ~lectric
Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804,807,25 P.3d 117,120 (Idaho 2001).
The Madison County Board of County Commissioners is regarded as the "Board" herein; the Madison County ~.
Planning and Zoning Commission is regarded as the "Commission" herein.
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, p.14.
82 -...
Id
83SOUthForlc Coalition v Board of Comrnissione/ S of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857,860,792 P.2d 882,885
(Idaho 1990).
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76 Fischer V. City ofKetchum,

that the legislature though relevant, ignored an important aspect of the problem,
provided an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the agency, or
involved a clear error of judgment. The focus of this inquiry is on the methods by
which the agency arrived at its decision: for example, did the agency not only
consider all the right questions, did it consider some wrong ones? Does the
relationship between the facts found @ndthe conclusion reached reveal gaps in the
logic of the reasoning process? Again, the question of judicial review largcly
devolves into question of whether the agency was rea~onable.~~
In Madison County, a comprehensive plan change and a zone change begins with the
Commission. The Commission's duty is to recommend findings to the Board, who then may
accept, deny, or hold a public hearing on the proposed amendment to the colnprehensiveplan or
zone change." A comprehensive plan, although not being a legally controlling zoning law, serves
as a guide to the Commission and Board charged with making zoning decisions.86 The Board
cannot ignore the Madison County comprehensive plan when adopting or amending zoning

ordinance^.^^

Bums spends some time outlining its application and comparing it to the Walters

~ Walters' case, their application was made
application, heard the same evening by the ~ o a r d . 'In
on October 4,2004.'~ The street address of the property is 4626 South 2860 West and consists of
approxilnately 1 19 acres.90 This property was transitional two/agriculture and the northwest
comer of the property is zoned industrial and adjoins existing industrial zoning." Access to and
fiom the property would be using the first of three main entrances and exitsto Rexburg, known as
the south exit located approximately one-half a mile away.92 Also, this property's north side

Michael S. Gillmore &Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act: a Primer for thePractitioner, 30
Idaho L. Rev. 273 365 (1993).
Idaho Code $67-6511(b).
'"one v. C i y ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844,850,693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984).
87 Id.
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, pp. 14-19.
R. Vol. 4 at Walters Tab 1.
O' Id.
" Id.
" Id.
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''

borders industrial, bark plants and transitional two

The property across the roadway to

the west is zoned coinmercia~.~~
The Walters' site was to be used for the operation of a gravel pit
with no buildings placed on the property.95
In comparison, Burns' application was dated Nove~nber19, 2 0 0 4 , ~and
~ is located at
approximately 3000 ~01th.'~This would place the two properties approximately six miles and
three overpasses (as noted below) apart from each other. Bums' property consisted of
approximately 50 acres and is not surrounded or bordered by commercial property.98
There are three interchanges that are commonly used in the City of Rexburg: the south
interchange, the middle interchange and the north inter~hange.'~Of them, the south and middle
interchanges have commercial/indusbrid uses around them; the north does not.Io0 The fact is,
seeing as the applicants' locations are drastically different, as are the proposed uses, the
comprehensive plan treats them differently. From Appellant's Opening Brief, Appendixes A-C
show there are no industrial or commercial uses near the north interchange where Bums proposed
its site. It was argued correctly by Madison County in front of the district court that this area
remains pristine.'0'
The dissimilarities continue between the two applicants, and are best contrasted as set out
by the Board in their Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision in each case. For
example, with Waiters, the Board found:'02
" I d atpp. 10-11.
" Id. atp.13.
R. Vo!. 4 Waiters Tab 4.
96 R. Voi. 4 Bums Tab 12.
" R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14.
R. Vo!. 4 Bums Tab 12.
99 R, Transcript from August 11,2006, hearing before Judge Moss, Case No. CV-2005-255, p.22, LL.ll-15.
loo
Id.. 0.22., LL.15-23.
lo'
Id., p.24, LL.2-8.
'02 The Waiters Findings of Fact and Conclusio~~s
of Law by. the Board could not be found in the record, so a reference
is made to the Respondent's Reply Brief instead (R.Vol. 1 at 189).
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'*

"

The proposed amendment seeks the addition of a commercial and light industrial
zone near State Highway 191 where it intersects with 4700 South. The property
sought to be rezoned is bounded on the south by 4700 South and on the east by
State Highway 191, U. S. Highway 20, and by the rail lines of the Eastern Idaho
Railroad. Six industrial areas exist within the surrounding area: Mountain West
Bark, commonly referred to as "The Bark Plant," is in an industrial zone located to
the north of the site; Western Fence, Inc., is a non-conforming use located west of
the site; Benchmark Potato is a non-conforming use located west by southwest of
the site; Mr. Driveline is a non-conforming use located south of the site; Edstrom
Gravel Pit is a non-conforming use located east by northeast of the site. (Findings
pp. 13-14).
For Bums, the Board found:'03
The project site currently is planned and zoned as agricultural and historically has
been and still is used as agricultural ground. Existing surrounding uses include
agricultural and residential uses. There are no other commercial or industrial areas
located close to the project site. The proposed colnmercial area would be located
adjacent to U.S. Highway 20, while the proposed industrial area would abut property
owned by Alice Hegstead which is currently designated and actually in use as
agricultural.
Regarding Walters, no concerns were voiced regarding the location of the Walters access
due to traffic volume, sight restrictions or vehicle speed, all of which were major issues in the
Bums' hearing.Io4 Those testifying at the Walters' hearing were primarily concerned with
property values, buffering, potential pollution from the gravel pit, and more gravel trucks traveling
county roads.lo5 However, six other industrial properties already existed in the neighborhood area,
including one already working gravel pit.'OG As stated in the Madison County co~nprehensiveplan,
industrial uses are to be grouped.'07 Approval of the Walters project in an area within city limits,

'"

R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Findings of Fact
and Conclus~onsof Law, dated June 1,2008, at pp.5-6.
'"Id, item number 3, Public Hearing transcript on Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, dated February
28,2005, at p. 17, LL.8 through p.45, LL.4.
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 3, Publrc Hearing
Re: Walter's Concrete dated February 28, 2005, at p. 17 through p 49, LL 2.
R. Vol. 4 Walters Tab 1.
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Findings of Fact
and Conclus~onsof Law, dated June 1,2006, pp 14-16.
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'"
'"
'"

bounded by railroad line, where six other industrial sites, including one gravel pit already are in
existence, is in full compliance with the comprehensive plan.
In comparison, the Bums property has no commercial property located near it, while the
Walters property has a number of both commercial and industrial properties located nearby. Bums
also proposed the construction of a cement batch plant and provided a number of plans as to the
location and design of the plant and buildings. Whereas Walters only proposed to dig a gravel pit.
Decisions by the Board must be "based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive
plan."'08 The Board has to make its decision on a case by case determination. As stated in
Southfork Coalition v. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, "comprehensive plans do not
themselves operate as legally controlling zoning law, but rather serve to guide and advise the
various governing bodies responsible for making zoning decisions. . . . [Tlhe determination of
whether a zoning ordinance is 'in accordance with' the comprehensive plan is one of fact. As a
question of fact, the determination is for the governing body charged with zoning . . . .rr109
In this case, the Board undertook a factual inquiry as to the relationship between what
Burns wanted and what the comprehensive plan stated. The Board found the zoning action was
not in accordance with the comprehensive plan."o The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
itself is evidence that the Board balanced competing interests and reviewed the applicable statutes,
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances, and did the appropriate component analysis as required
by law.'" The problem with the residents and the Board was largely Bums' 10cation.''~

Idaho Code 5 67-6535(b).
~outhforkCoalition v. BoardofCorr2m i-s ofBonneville Counw, 1 17 Idaho 857,863,792 P.2d 882,888 (Idaho
1990) (quotations and citations omitted).
'I0 See, e.g., Ur&ia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (Idaho 2000); R. Binder with Augmentations from
Order of December 24,2007, item 6, pp.19-23.
'I' R. Binder.with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007, item number 6, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, dated June 1,2006, pp.5-24.
R. Transcript from August 11,2006, hearing berore Judge Moss, Case No. CV-2005-255, p:20, LL.4-6; R. Vol. 4'
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'09

"'

In conclusion, the Walters and Bums projects were so vastly different in type, scope,
impact, neighboring uses, and distance, that differing decisions on the projects were entirely
appropriate. The Board made the correct decision in that no violation of law occurred. As such,
the Board's decision should be upheld.
Bums further argues the Board should have articulated why the Burns decision was
different than walters.'13 LLUPA only requires the Board make a written "reasoned statement" as
to each application, per Idaho Code § 67-6535(a)-(b). This statute provides:
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall
(a)
be based upon standards and criteria which shall set forth in the comprehensive
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or
county.
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall
(b)
he in writing and accompanied by reasoned statement that explains the criteria and
standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable provisions of the
comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. ' I 4

...
Idaho Code $ 67-65I9(4) also states:
Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning commission
(4)
grants or denies a permit, it shall specify:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the
application;
The reasons for approval or denial; and
The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a
pennit.

Burns Tab 14.
"3 Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3, 2007, p.19.
Idaho Code $ 67-6535fa)-(b).
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Here, the Board made a reasoned statement as to Burns' application and did not have to
compare it to Walters' or any other applicant's application for that matter. For these reaspns, the
Board's finding must be further upheld.
C.

Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002)
should not be extended to require that oral testimony of lay witnesses be supported
by other credible evidence before such lay testimony ean be adopted.

In essence, Bums states that if the Board allegedly failed to follow the Evans

~t Board oj

Commissioners of Cassia County case, it would be a procedural error under Idaho Code §

In Evans v. Board ofCom 'rs of Cassia County, this Court held that "[ilt would not be
feasible to require those conducting this type of hearing, who frequently are not trained in the law,
to accept only the evidence which would be admissible in a court proceeding. Here, the Board
properly considered substantial evidence and heard testimony of those individuals who had an
interest in the

proceeding^.""^ This Court is to "consider the proceedings as a whole and to

evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations
with an emphasis on fbndamental fairness and the essentials of reason decision-making."116The
Board's factual findings are not clearly erroneous in this case because it is supported by substantial,
competent, although conflicting evidence.'17
In this case, the credibility of the witnesses and evidence was assessed first hand by the
Board, both at the February 28,2005 comprehensive plan public hearing,"* as well as the review
of the record once again on April 13,2006."~ This Court will not substitute its judgment for that

"'Evans, 137 Idaho 428,447,50 P.3d 443,432 (Idaho 2002).
Idaho Code 5 67-6535.
" ' ~ e ee.g., F+iends o f F a ~ mtoMarket, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 ~ . 3 9,d 13 (Idaho 2002).
R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 26.
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of Decemher.24,2007", item numher'5, Public eari in^
dated April 13,2006, at p.1, LL.l-13.
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of the zoning agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.'20 "[A] local zoning
agency's interpretation of its own ordinances, even if questionable, without more, does not
necessarily amount to a violation [.I"'~'
Bums argues to this Court that the Board's reliance on oral claims and testimony was
~ ~ Code requires the Board to "provide an opportunity
improper without further e v i d e n ~ e . 'Idaho
for all effected persons to present and rebut e~idence.""~Furthcr, the APA sets out exactly what
is supposed to he included in an agency record found in Idaho Code 5 67-5249. This includes in
part, evidence received or considered, notices, melnorandum and transcripts of the record.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence also set out the framework for determining when witnesses
may testify and to what they may testify. Once a witness has been qualified to testify in a given
issue, the weight ultimately assigned to that witness' testimony is left completely to the trier of fact.
Neither the Rules of Evidence, nor case law, requires a trier of fact to assign more weight to the
testimony of an expert as opposed to a lay person. Indeed, Idaho Rules of Evidence 701 and 702
states as follows:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue,
and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
'I9

1d at p. 3, LL. 8-25; p.4, LL.1-25; p.5, LL.1

Lamar Corp v Czty of Twzn Falls, 133 Idaho 36,39,981 P.2d 1146,1149 (1999);Idaho Code 3 67-5279(1).
Evans v Board of Corn 'rs of Cassia County, 137 ldaho 428,447,50 P.3d 443,432 (Idaho 2002).
'22 Appellant's Opening Brief dated December 3,2007, p.19.
'23 Idaho Code 5 67-6534.
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12'

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
In this case, the record is full of experiences from fife-long residents of Madison County
and citizens who had done their research before testifj4ng. Examples of this include Val Ball,
living across the road from Bums' proposed site who testified that he can only get his truck up to
15 miles per hour before he hits the top of the overpass and a turning lane would not help the

traffic.lz4 The record is also full of people that thoroughly reviewed the comprehensive plan and
zoning ordinances.Iz5 The same matter was repeated at the February 28,2005 public hearing in
~ included were documents from the public regarding their review of
front of the B ~ a r d . " Also
industrial zones, Madison County zoning ordinances, and the number of homes surrounding the
proposed site.Iz7
Hence, the standard, if one even exists from Evans v. Board of Comrn 'rs ofcassia County,
has been met in that the Board had the opportunity to hear numerous comments from the audience,
surrounding cities, as well as statements from various local attorneys and from Burns.
Additionally, there were numerous exhibits, written documents, and tapes entered into evidence
for the Board's review, and the witnesses appeared so the Board could assess their credibility
firsthand. The evidence heard by the Board was substantial and competent, although it was not
un-contradicted; but the evidence does not need to lead to a certain conclusion, it need only be of
sufficient quantity and probativc value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as
the fact finder."'

124 R.

For these reasons, the Board's decision must also be upheld.

Vol. 4 Bums Tab 14; Planningand Zoning Minutes December 16,2004, p.10.
id., atpp.11-18.
'26 R. V01.4 Burns Tab 26 at 4-13.
12' R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 9; R. Vol. 4 Bums Tab 10.
12' Mann v. Safiway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,7Y6,518 P.2d 1194, 1998 (Idaho 1974).
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'"

D.

The Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
"To hold that a finding is not clearly erroneous, there must be substantial evidence in the

record to support the finding."'2q "The 'substantial evidence rule' is said to be a 'middle position'
which precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes
beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity."'30 Even under the APA, "[tlhe court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the evidence on questions of fact."I3'
Substantial has been further described as follows:
Bv substantial. it is not meant that the evidence need be un-contradicted. All that is
required is that the evidence be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that
reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. It is not
necessary that the evidence be of such quantity or quality that reasonable minds
must conclude, only that they could conclude.'32
-

-

Even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, an agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court so long as the determinations are supported by
substantial competent evidence in the record.'33
Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence, but more
This Court wrote, "the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a
than a mere scinti11a.I~~
court to determine 'whether [the agency's] findings of fact are rea~onable.""~~
"The governing body charged with making zoning decisions 'in accordance with' the
Comprehensive Plan must 'make a factual inquiry into whether requested zoning ordinance or

12'

Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581,588,726 ~ . 2 693,700
d
(Idaho 1986).

'" Id. (internal citations omitted.)
"' Idaho Code 5 67-5279(1).

Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 ldaho 732,736,518 P.2d 1194,1998 (Idaho 1974) (a case dealing with substantial
evidence in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but equally applicable in actions for judicial review of
the Board action in this case).
Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofsun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374,378 (Idaho 2007).
Evans v. Hara's, Inc, 123 Idaho 473,478,849 P.2d 934,939 (Idaho 1993).
13' Pace v. Hymas, 11 1 Idaho 581,589,726 P.2d 693,701 (Idaho 1986) (internal citations omitted).
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amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors in, the Comprehensive Plan
in light of the present factual circumstances surrounding the request.rr9136 In looking at the totality
of the record, considering the proceedings as a whole, and evaluating the adequacy of the
procedures and resulting decision in light of practical considerations according to Idaho Code 5
67-6535(c), the Board's decision should be upheld.
'
spends a lot of time discussing the
As stated in the Appellant's Opening ~ r i e f , ' ~Burns
transportation, traffic and safety of the north interchange of Highway 20 and the Salem Road.
James Pline gave a written report that was included in the Bums presentation, and the
audio-visual report, which was played for the Board during the hearing.'38 Mr. Pline based
portions of his report on the 2003 Trafic Analysis perfonned by the Dyer Group, and the 2004
Sqfety Analysis perfonned by John W. Becker of the Idaho Transportation Department. 139 Both
are included in the Appendixes of his written report.140Burns also relied on parts of the Madison
, ' on
~ ~portions of the report
County Transportation Plan, also known as the Keller ~ e ~ o r tand
from the Idaho Transportation Department. 14'
Mr. Pline stated in his audio-visual report that he had spent approximately two to three
hours actually viewing the intersection at issue prior to issuing his report.'43 It is unknown what
time of day or year he reviewed the intersection. He said that the sideline from the westbound US

~viansv. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (Idaho 2003); ciling Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho
844,850,693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984).
R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, p.21.
138
R. Exhibit 11 and 14 (James L. Pline, Trafflc Analysis, Burns Holdings, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 20
Interchange, December 9,2004).
O9 Id, at Exhibit 11.
I4O Id,
14' R. Exhibit 10, Keller Associates, Madison County TransportationPlan, June 2004.
'42 R. Exhibit 4-5, Idaho TransportatiooDepartment, Crashes by Year and Severiry US 20 IC 337 (Salem IC)
2000-2003.
143 R. Exhibit 14 (James L. Pline, Audio Visual Report for Burns Holdings, LLC).
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Highway 20 off ramp to the Burns property access was 373 feet.144He also said the Salem Road
traffic north of the interchange north ramp intersection traveling both directions was 4,190
vehicles per day.I4' He said the collision summary for the north interchange since 2003 was 15
collisions, none of which occurred north of the interchange north ramp terminal inter~ection.'~~
Mr. Pline's reports, however, gave little credibility to the concerns regarding safety voiced by
those actually using the roadway routinely, if not daily, as testified at the hearings held on the
Taylor application, the hearings before the Commission, and the Board's hearing. Mr. Pline's
report also appears to have been prepared prior to the dccision of Burns to add commercial
businesses to the site, since the report indicated that, "future development of the remaining
property at the site is undetermined at this time. The future development of the remainingproperty,
type of development, traffic generation and roadway impacts will have to be addressed at a later
As a result, the proposed commercial usage
time when that development request is ~ubmitted."'~~
and vehicle impact of combined commercial and industrial uses at the site were never addressed by
Mr. Pline.
Mr. Pline also suggests the existing 45 milc per hour speed limit south of the interchange
on the Salem Road be extended to the north on Salem Road to "mitigate the ramp terminal
concerns and address the public perceptions."'48 In fact, we learn that the real speed limit on the
Salem Road is 50 miles per hour throughout the interchange area and a traffic study performed

I44

R: Exhibit 11, Tab 3, p. 2 (James L. Pline, Tiafic Analysis, Bums Holdings, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 20
Interchange, December 9,2004).
14' id at p.3.
'46 Id. at p.4.
147 Id. at p.2.
148 Id.
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later by the County indicated a higher actual average vehicle speed on the roadway at 57 miles per

The Traflc Analysis prepared by the Dyer Group in 2003, was included in the appendix to
Mr. Pline's written report.I5O However, Mr. Pline chose to ignore the warnings of Mr. Dyer as
inade on Page 2 of that analysis, which said:
From a safety perspective, everyone is aware that the North interchange has a sight
distance problem. The bridge structure is on a vertical curve and the off ramp is
located such that it is difficult to see oncoming traffic, most of which is traveling at
a high rate of speed. There have been several incidents and nuillemus near-misses
at this location, and thus it will be wise to assure that the proposed approach into the
Salein Highway is separated as far as possible from the U.S. 20 interchangeloff
ramp area to keep from aggravating the situation. Although the recommended
northbound left turning lane will keep vehicles out of the main traffic stream on the
Salem Highway, it also presents a potential for visible barrier obscuring the
south-bound traffic if not properly separated froin the off ramp location, further
justifying keeping the approach to the north. 'sI
The Dyer Group included as part of its T ~ a f i Analysis,
c
a 2003 report from the Idaho
Transportation Department which indicated average daily traffic on the Salem Highway to be
6,600 vehicles.'52
The S a f t y Analysis prepared by John W. Becker of the Idaho Transportation Department,
indicated average daily traffic volume on the Salem Road at 6,000 vehicles for 2002.'53 Mr.
Becker's analysis also indicated that for 2000-2002, there had been four accidents at the
interchange, three on the westbound off ramp, and one on the eastbound off ramp.'54 Both Mr.

149R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmenlations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 1, Public Hearing
Re: Bums Holding, LLC, dated February 18,2005, at p.88, LL.23 through p.90, at LL.lO.
ld., Tab 3.
15' Id., Dyer Group Traffic Analysis.
152

r r
la.

R. Exhibit 5, John W. Becker, Safely Analysis ofthe Salem Road at the North Rexburg Interclzmzgc, January 2004;
See also R. Burns Tab 5 at 4,s.
Id.
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Becker and Mr. Pline disagreed with the Dyer Group as to the sight distance problem at the
interchange, hut no reference to this disagreement was made in Mr. Pline's reports.
Dusty Cureton, the Madison County Road and Bridge Supervisor, testified as aparticipant
at the hearing before the Board on the Burns application.15sMr. Cureton had been requested to
perform a traffic study on the site and report his findings at the hearing.Is6 He said he had figures
on a study done in 2001, which indicated that 3,300 vehicles used the Salem Highway in a day, of
which 236 were co~nmercialvehicles or trucks.Is7 NO direction of traffic was listed for the
vehicles. The average speed of those vehicles was 42 miles per hour, with the highest speed being
66 miles per hour.I5* He also reported that in his current study, he found that 8,300 vehicles used
the Salem Highway Erorn the overpass going south, and 3,919 vehicles traveled the Salem
Highway from the overpass going north.lS9 Of the northbound vehicles, 197 were comrner~ial.'~~
The average speed of these vehicles going north was 57 miles per hour and the highest speed was

84 miles per hour.'6'
During the hearing, a number of county residents also testified against the proposal and
directly to these points.162Of these, several testified specifically about the dangerous condition of
the north Rexburg interchange, based upon their personal observations and use of this interchange.
Those testifying specifically about safety concerns at the interchange were Dale Thomson,
Courtney Ferguson, Harold Harris, Winston Larson, Tarnmie Ostermiller, Gerald Lusk, Jared

Is' R.VOI. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 1, Public Hearing
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC dated February 28,2005, at p.88, LL.19-25 through p.90, LL.21.
Id., p.88, LL.12-14.
Id., p.88, LL.23 through p.89, LL.19.
IS8 ~ d .
Is9 Id., p.89, LL.20 through p.90, LL.14.
1d.,~.90, LL.13-14.
16' Id., p.90, LL.8-11.
16* Id.,p.17, LL.4 t h g h p . 8 8 , L L . 5 .
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Ostenniller, Ben Romney, Ken Sakota, Rich Leuwellen, Vonda Smith, Lawrence Coates, Colleen
Coates, Layne Ball, Garth Hillman, Val Ball, and Layle ~ a ~ l e ~ . ' ~ ~
Though Burns argues the residents' concerns should not be given much weight by the
county if any weight at all, the fact is these people testified they personally drive the Salein
Highway and travel over the north interchange on a regular, if not daily basis, and some had
specific knowledge of accidents and injuries and other safety concerns. These include Harold
Harris' testimony from the comprehensive plan hearing,'64Gerald Lusk's testimony regarding
what he has seen as a school bus driver,'65Rich Leuwellen, who lives right on that comer,'66Lane
Ball, who testified in the last eleven months there had been 15 accidents and over 50 speeding
tickets at this location,'67and Val Ball who witnessed six inajor accidents and one or two minor
ones in the last four months. 16* Mr. Ball, who lives on the northeast comer, observed that during
the majority of the summer the traffic nearly doubles with people going to and froin the sand
dunes.'69 Layle Bagley also sees the traffic every morning from 7:00 to 8:30 a.m. and believes that
no one is going to get a long truck over the hill without backing up traffic clear hack to the next
comer.170
The practical concerns and actual experiences and observations of those living near and
traveling daily over the road and interchange at issue carried significant weight with the ~ 0 a r d . l ~ '

Id.
Id., p.35, LL.18 through p.37, LL.25.
165
Id., p.49, LL.20 through p.50, LL.16.
166
Id.,p.65, LL.13 throughp.67, LL.13.
167
Id.,p.75, LL.l-23.
1681d.,p.81,LL.1throughp.82,LL.19.
16'

169

rv

1U.

I7O Id.,p.85,
171

LL.18 throughp.87, LL.15.
R. Vol. entitled "Binder with augmentations from Order of December 24,2007, item number 5, Public Hearing
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC, dated April 13,2006, at p.53, LL.13 through p.67, LL.6.
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In this case, the Board found the testimony of the lay witnesses and the Road and Bridge
supervisor, Mr. Cureton, more compelling in making a determination as to the safety of the
roadway and intersection at issue. The difference in traffic volu~nenumbers as reported by each
expert and the use of reports from prior years, led the Board to rely on the current traffic volume
count made by Mr. C~reton.'~'
These lay witnesses did not fonn their opinions based on a few observations at the
intersection, but on frequent, if not daily usage of the roadway and intersection at all times of the
day, night and year. The amount of traffic actually using the roadway and number of accidents
occurring, varied from expert to expert, made it doubly reasonable for the Board to rely on its own
actual count of vehicles and on the personal observations of those actually and regularly using the
roadway. While the advent of large cement trucks using the interchange may not increase the
number of accidents, they would increase the risk of accidents being more serious, and that was
significant to the Board. Thus, in looking at the documentary evidence and testimony about the
sight restrictions existing at the interchange, the testimony of those actually driving the
interchange and living nearby as to its dangers, the testimony regarding the potential increase in
regular vehicle and heavy truck traffic coming from the proposed cement batch plant, and thc
potential increase in heavy commercial traffic coming from the proposed commercial property, all
support and justify the Board's decision regarding traffic and safety at the proposed project site
The Board's decision relating to traffic and safety is based on substantial evidence, and was
not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
As to the other items listed in the component analysis brought up by ~ u r n s ,these
' ~ ~ too
were thoroughly discussed in the initial hearing,'74the rehearing,'75and analyzed in the Board's
Id
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

These documents speak for themselves and will not

be reproduced here, but these too were based upon substantial evidence, and were not arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court agreed with the Board, specifically
holding that the Board did not violate any constitutional or statutory provisions nor exceed its
statutory authority; the Board's decision was not made upon unlawful procedure; the Board's
decision was supported by substantial evidence, and in looking at the entire record, the Board's
AS such, the Board's decision
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of di~creti0n.l~~
should be upheld.

E.

Burns has not shown a substantial right prejudiced.

The APA, as stated above, has two requirements for the type of relief outlined in Idaho
Code $ 67-5279. Burns must first show a specific violation of $ 67-5279(3), and then must show
that "substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."'78 This statute is applied instead of
Idaho Code $67-6535(c) because the APA standard is more specific.179Idaho Code 3 67-6535(c)
is helpful, however, in understanding the standards as this Court held in Evans v. Teton County,
that "I.C.

3 67-6535(c) requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right

~~
this Court
in order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA d e c i s i ~ n . " ' Further,
noted in Friends ofFarm to Market, that "due process applies to quasi judicial proceedings like

R. Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 3,2007, at pp 35-42.
V01.4 Burns Tab 28.
'71 R. VoI. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 5, Publ~cHeanng
dated Apnl 13,2006, at p.6, LL. 14 through p.71, LL.23.
'71 R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number 6, Fmdings of Fact
and Concluszons of Law, dated June 1,2006, at pp 5-23.
'77 R. Vo1. 3 at 492-505.
'71 Idaho Code $67-5279(4).
179Blaha v Board ofAda Counly Comrn'rs, 134 Idaho 770,774,9 P.3d 1236,1240 (Idaho 2000).
Evans, 139 Idaho 71,76,73 P.3d 84,89 (Idaho 2003).
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those conducted by zoning boards, and such due process requires notice of the proceedings,
specific written findings of fact, and an opportunity to be present and rebut e~idence."'~'
Burns' assertion that it has been deprived of a substantial right is based entirely upon the
Board's interpretation of the facts. Burns does not challenge procedural defects with LLUPA. In
fact, the Board's findings and conclusion are supported by substantial and competent evidence and
Bums had ample opportunity to present and rebut evidence, were notified of all the proceedings,
and were provided a copy of specific findings of fact, in compliance with Idaho Code 5 67-5279(4).
Though there was conflicting evidence before the Board, the Board's factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court so long as they are supported by substantial competent evidence in
the record.'82
This Court in the past has weighed in on what a substantial right is. In Sanders Orchard v.
Gen County, this Court found that a county basing its decisions upon findings that were not

supported by any evidence in the record was sufficient to prejudice substantial rights of the
applicant.'83 Also, in 2002, this Court held that the county commissioners viewing the applicant's
property did not violate a substantial right of the applicant.'84
There is also similarity in "takings" cases, where a regulation denies an owner of all
economically viable use of land. "Takings" would be violative of a substantial right.Ix5 The
Federal Courts have held that a historical use of land is presumed to be economically viable.Ia6 In

Is'Friends ofFarm to Market, 137 1daho 192,198,46 P.3d 9, 15 (Idaho 2002).
"'See, e.g., Friends ofFarm toMarket, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13.
"I Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,702,52 P.3d 840,847 (Idaho 2002).
Evans v. Board of Comm 'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,433,50 P.3d 443,448 (Idaho 2002).
185See,
e.g., C&G, Inc, v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 146,75 P.3d 194,200 (Idaho 2003) (holding
that a "takings" implicates the Constitution whichin turn was designed to protect substantial rights).
Is' MacLeod v. Santa Clara County, 749 F.2d 541,545-547 (9th Cir. 1984).
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MacLeod, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the denial of a proposed commercial
development was not a taking where the historical agriculture use was permitted to continue.Ia7
In this case, Bums knew the property's use and purchased it after prior requests to change
the comprehensive plan designation of the property had been denied. His speculative purchase of
the ground in the hopes that its zoning would be allowed does not mean the Board denied Burns
any economic use of the property. Bums is left with the same use the property historically had, and
the Board's refksal to grant any speculative adventure or re-zone of the property does not
constitute prejudicing of any substantial right.
,'~~
Bums' case is distinguishable from Sanders Orchard v. Gem ~ o u r z t ~because
concerning Bums, the Board relied upon numerous written documents and oral testimony
regarding the placement of the plant and concerns over the proposed zone change. The Board also
made extensive findings regarding the same. Though the Board did not agree with Bums' ultimate
dcsire for the use of the property, it cannot be said that in so doing, violating the substantial right of
Burns.
Even if this Court were to conclude the Board's decision was not based upon substantial
evidence, was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion under Idaho Code 5 67-5279, there
still must be a showing of a substantial right of Bums being prejudice, and Bums cannot make such
a showing, so their appeal must be denied.
Burns is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal to the district court
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-117, nor to this Court, whereas Madison County is.

F.

Where the district court properly applied the law and understood the discretionary nature of
its action in making or declining the award of fees, this Court will overturn that decision only upon

Id.

'''Sanders Orchard v Gem County ex rel Bd

ofcounty Corn 'rs, 137 Idaho 695,52 P.3d 840 (Idaho 2002)
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a showing of abuse of di~creti0n.l~~
"The appellate court exercises free review over the decision of
~ Court summed up this statute as follows:
the district court in applying LC. $ 12-11 7 . " ' ~This
The purpose of Idaho Code $ 12-117 is two-fold: First it serves "as a deterrent to
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have
made." An award of attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-117 has been distilled into a
two-part test. Attorney fees must be awarded if (1) the Court finds in favor of the
person, and (2) the City or County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340,343
(Idaho 2004).
The core of this provision then is, "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." As shown
herein and also as stated by the district court, the Board acted with a reasonable basis in both fact
and law. Hence, Bums' request for attorney fees and costs should be denied under Idaho Code 5
12-1 17.
Bums also seeks reversal of the district court's decision to not award attorney fees under
Idaho Code $ 12-121. This section is limited to cases initiated by complaint, and does not apply in
Assuming arguendo
cases of administrative actions and land use decisions initiated by petiti~n.'~'
it does apply, the Board prevailed at the district court below, and it cannot be said the Board acted
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundati~n."~
Madison County also seeks attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code $ 12-117, which
provides for an award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party if the other party acted
without a reasonable basis and fact or law. Cowan v. Board ofCom 'rs ofFremont County, 143
Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1266 (Idaho 2007). In this case, Bums is rearguing facts that have been
1 8 9 ~ v.o xBoard of Counly Corn'rs, 121 Idaho 684,685,827 P.2d 697,698 (Idaho 1992).
'90~zscher
v Clry ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,355-356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097-1098 (Idaho 2005).
Lowery v Board of County Com'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079,1081-82,793 P.2d 1251,1253-254 (Idaho
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carefully considered by the Board more than once in this case, and consequently, acted without a
basis in law or fact.
As stated above, it is unclear if attorney fees and costs are applicable under Idaho Code 5
12-121 to this action. Cowan, above, cites Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. ofpittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon,
141 Idaho 537, 542, 112 P.3d 825, 830 (Idaho 2005) holding ‘‘Lain award under this statute is
appropriate if the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or defended
Erivolously, unreasonably or without fo~ndation."'~~
If proper, Madison County requests the same.
This appeal was brought so this Court could attempt to second guess the Board's findings of fact.
Consequently, this appeal is made frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code $5 12-117 and 12-121 is thus
warranted to Madison County.
G.

Granting Burns' request for a comprehensive plan change would amount to invalid
spot zoning.
Bums' request, if granted, would require invalid type two spot zoning in Madison County.

As stated in Evans v. Teton County:
A claim of "spot zoning" is essentially an argument the change in zoning is not in
accord with the Comprehensive Plan. There are two types of "spot zoning." Type
One may simply refer to a re-zoning of property for a use prohibited by the original
zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone re-classification is valid is
whether the zone is in accord with the Comprehensive Plan. Type Two spot zoning
refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the
permitted use in the rest of thc zoning district for the benefit of an individual
property owner. This latter type of spot zoning is i n ~ a 1 i d . l ~ ~
As stated above, the Burns property has been designated both by the comprehensive plan
and zoning ordinance as transitional/agriculture.The property surrounding Bums' property is also
1990); Knight v. Dep't oflnsurance, 119 Idaho 591,593,808 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. App. 1991).
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131,136,75 P.3d 185,190 (Idaho 2003).
C w a n v. Board of Corn 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1266.(Idaho2007).

'92 See

'"
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designated in the comprehensive plan as transitionallagriculture, and in the zoning ordinance is
designated as either agriculture or transitional agricultural two. The actual use of the Burns
property has always been agricultural. The actual use of the property surrounding the Bums
property has also either been agricultural or residential. There are no commercial zones or
grandfathered uses in the county within some miles of the Bums property. There are also no light
industrial zones.
The Madison comprehensive plan lists as a goal, at p. 22, "it shall be the responsibility of
Madison County to protect the agricultural industry from inappropriate and uncontrolled
residential or non-agricultural growth, given that this industry is the economic mainstream of the
~ o u n t ~ . To
" ' ~further
~
this goal, the comprehensive plan lists the following objectives, also from
p. 22 as: "I) to keep urban-type (high traffic commercial, non-agricultural industrial, high-density
residential) growth within the areas of city impact, as established by mutual agreement between
the cities and the county."
In addition, the Madison County comprehensive plan, at p. 17, states:'96
It is the policy of the citizens to allow and encourage such development in the
appropriate industrial zones. The citizens will encourage the recruitment of clean
industries that will coinplement their county. The majority of industrial uses shall
be located within area of impacts where city services are more likely to be available.
Exceptions to this might include mining, farm services, and the initial processing of
commodities including grain elevators and "fresh pack" potato plants.
The County will encourage the grouping of industrial uses in land developed as an
industrial park.

In'Evans

v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76-77,73 P.3d 84,89-90 (Idaho 2003) (internal citations omitted).

'" R. Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007, item number 6, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, dated June 1,2006, p.7.
'" 6d. at p. 14.
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Bums' own appendixes attached to the Appellant's Opening Brief show that the parcel of
land is surrounded by farm land as also testified to by Alice Hegstead, an elderly widow, who was
concerned about the impact the project will have on the value of her ground.'97 Directly east of the
Bums property, across the Salem Highway, is the home of Val Ball, including his outbuildings and
agricultural land.'98 On the west, the Bums property is bordered by more farm ground. On the
southwest comer of the Bums property, the neighboring use is a fonner gravel pit, now reclaimed
as a pond, and then still more farm ground. Bums' demand to amend the zoning of this property
from transitional/agricultural to commercial with light industrial, is a demand for the Board to
improperly "spot zone" its property. This property is not within an area of city impact, nor are
there any light industrial or commercial areas anywhere in the vicinity of the Bums property. The
surrounding ground is all classified in the comprehensive plan as transitional/agricultural,and the
uses of the surrounding properties are limited to agricultural or residential uses.
As a result, it is impossible to comply with the Madison County comprehensive plan by
placing an industrial use and commercial zone dropped right in the middle of a
transitional/agriculturalzone. As such, re-zoning the Bums property would single out "a parcel of
land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an
individual property owner."'99 Hence, this Court should not allow a re-designation of the Madison
County comprehensive plan for the benefit of the Bums' property as requested.

R. Vol. entitled "Binder with Augmentations from Order of December 24,2007", item number I, Public Hearing
Re: Bums Holdings, LLC dated February 28,2005, at p.41.
'"Id.,atp.81.
vans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,7677, P.3d 84,89-90 (Idaho 2003).
~es~ondent's
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"'

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Coult should affinn the district court's decision
denying Bums' request for a colnprehensive plan designation change. In addition, Madison
County should receive an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
Respectfully submitted this
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